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Case No. 14597 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Appellant, who was 
the Plaintiff in the Lower Court/ seeking to obtain a commission 
for the alleged sale of the home of the Respondents/ who were 
the Defendants in the Lower Court, as well as attorney's fees 
alleged required to be expended by the Appellant by reason 
of the action in the Lower Court and wherein the Respondents 
have filed a Counterclaim in the Lower Court seeking to recover 
from the Plaintiff the losses resulting to the Defendants by. 
reason of the failure of the consummation of a sale of the 
home undertaken by the Plaintiff, including the expenditure 
of attorney's fees made by the Respondents and Counterclaimants 
by reason of the failure of the sale of Respondents' home. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court dismissed the Appellant's cause of action 
and held for the Respondents on their Counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondents seek affirmation of the Judgment of 
the Lower Court rendered in favor of the Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents were desirous of selling their old home 
in order to build a new home/ and prior to entering into a 
brokerage contract with the Appellant/ advised the Appellant 
that the Respondents would need all of the equity that they 
could get out of their old home in order to have sufficient 
money to purchase land and build a new home. (R-101) The Respondent 
advised the Appellant/ that they would accept nothing but cash 
for their equity and were interested only in obtaining qualified 
buyers, and the Respondents have testified that the Appellant 
stated that, "I'll bring only qualified buyers". (R-102] 
That on April 12 , 1974/ a Sales Agency Contract was entered 
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into, wherein the Respondents were the sellers and the Appellant, 
as a real estate broker, was the sales agent of the Respondents 
and agreed at that time by the terms of the contract to obtain 
a price of $38,900.00 on behalf of the Respondents and the 
agreement provided: 
During the life of this contract, if you find a 
party who is ready, able, and willing to buy, 
lease, or exchange said property, or any part 
thereof, *** I agree to pay you a commission of 
6 percent of such sale, lease, or exchange. 
(Def.Exh.3) (Emphasis Added) 
The Respondents testified that they believed that the condition 
of the sale of the listing for sale was that the person would 
be "qualified to purchase the home at that price" (R-102). 
On July 20, 1974, an Earnest Money Agreement was entered 
into by and between the Respondents and Mr. and Mrs. Stephens 
as the buyers and who will be referred to herein as buyers, 
wherein they agreed to purchase the home for $39,900.00 with 
$500.00 down, leaving a balance of $39,400.00 to be paid October 1, 
1974, and the buyers obtaining a conventional loan of 95 percent, 
providing for the sellers to pay buyers closing costs, appraisal 
fees, taxes, and insurance reserves, providing further for 
the delivery of the final contract on August 16, 1974, buyers 
to pay the sum of $368.00 monthly until the closing out of 
the Earnest Money Agreement by a conventional loan payment by 
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the buyers. The real estate broker listed on the Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase being the Appellant herein. (Def.Exh. 
10) 
The Respondents entered into the Earnest Money Agreement 
on the representation by the Appellant, that buyers had $500.00 
to put down and that they could buy out the Respondentsl entire 
equity in accordance with the Agreement entered into. (R-104) 
The original Agreement of July 20 was entered into by 
and between the Respondents and the buyers through the efforts 
of the Appellant and provided for no stipulation that the Respondent 
would carry any part of their equity on a contract but that 
they would be paid out entirely (R-105). 
On August 10, 1974, a second Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase was submitted by the Appellant to the Respondents 
when said buyers made an offer of $39,900.00 with a total downpay-
ment/ including the earnest money deposit, of $2,000.00, including 
the closing costs, providing for the obtaining by the buyers 
of a conventional loan, to which the Respondents made a counter-
offer providing for a sale price in the amount of $38,900.00, 
and specifically stating that the seller (the Respondents) 
would not carry the total contract and that the buyer was to 
obtain financing immediately with the sellers carrying up to 
$2,000.00 of the contract at $75.00 a month and at a rate of 9-1/2 
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percent interest, and further providing that if the buyers 
wish to pay their own closing costs, that the price would be 
$37,900.00 and the seller would carry $3,000.00 of the contract. 
This earnest money counter-offer was accepted by the Respondents 
and the buyer on August 13, 1974 (Def.Exh.ll). (Emphasis Added) 
At the time that the Respondents entered into the Earnest 
Money Agreement on August 13, 1974, the Respondents advised 
the Appellant, who was the real estate agent and broker of 
the Respondents, that the Earnest Money Agreement presented 
on behalf of the buyers was going to create a hardship on the 
Respondents because the money which was to be obtained from 
the sale as the equity of the Respondents, was going to be 
needed to buy a new home and that the Respondents needed all 
of the equity, "everything I can get out of the home" (R-105), 
and the Appellant responded that if Respondents would carry 
the small amount of the equity of the Respondents as set forth 
in the Contract of August 13, 1974, it would guarantee and 
expedite the obtaining of a loan by the buyers. (R-106) 
On August 17, 1974, the Appellant approached the Respondents 
and proposed a third Earnest Money Agreement providing for 
the Respondents to carry a contract balance in the sum of $5,900.00 
at 9-3/4 percent interest, the Appellant advising the Respondents, 
that such an agreement to carry a part of the equity would 
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guarantee the buyers obtaining a loan (R-106). The Respondents 
thereupon entered into a new Earnest Money Agreement on August 17, 
1974, providing for a total selling price of $38/900.00 with 
$2,000.00 as earnest money and downpayment and the Deed would 
be delivered on August 29, 1974, and providing for monthly 
installments to be paid by the buyers to the Respondents of 
the sum of $440.00 monthly until the buyers had obtained their 
financing and make arrangements for the closing of the loan. 
The Earnest Money Agreement was subscribed to by the Respondents 
and the buyers and also was signed by the Appellant as the 
real estate broker. (Def.Exh.2) 
On August 23, 1974, the Appellant advised the Respondents, 
that the buyers wanted to move into the home before the start 
of the school year, which was on August 26, 1974, and that 
the Appellant felt that the loan was secure, that there should 
be no problems and that the buyers would not back out of the 
purchase of the home if they could get in before the school 
year. (R-107) 
Respondents agreed to move out providing that the buyers 
would come up with the downpayment when the loan was closed 
out at Security Title Company. The Appellant advised the Respondent 
that this was only a temporary matter and in approximately 
thirty days the buyer would obtain his loan and that the Clearfield 
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State Bank had the funds and that there it was only necessary 
to wait until the Loan Officer return from vacation and that 
the loan was "pretty well guaranteed". (R-107,R-108) 
In reliance upon the representations made by the Appellant, 
the Respondents moved out of their home on August 24, 1974, 
and the buyers moved into the home. At which time, only the 
Earnest Money Agreement had been signed and the closing of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract was to take place at Security 
Title Company on August 27, 1974. (R-108) 
Prior to the closing of the sale of the property and 
entering into a Uniform Real Estate Contract, the Respondents 
were assured by the Plaintiff, in a conversation which occurred 
at the premises of the Security Title Company in Farmington, 
wherein the Appellant assured the Respondents, that the buyers 
should receive their loan in approximately thirty days. (R-
109) The Respondent stated that he was told by the Appellant, 
that the arrangement was only temporary, in that "approximately 
thirty days they (the buyers) should receive their loan", and 
the Respondent further testified that he would not have signed 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract had he known that he was not 
going to get the equity money from the buyers. (R-109) 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract was entered into August 27, 
1974, between the Respondents and the buyers in the presence 
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of the Appellant and provided for the sale of the home for 
a price of $38,900.00, and further provided for a downpayment 
in the amount of $1,951.95 with the buyer paying payments to 
Security Title Company in the amount of $440.00 monthly, commencing 
October 1, 1974, with said payment including interest, principal, 
taxes, and fire insurance premiums. The buyers agreeing to 
obtain a conventional loan as soon as possible and the sellers 
agreeing to assume and pay all expenses necessary and incidental 
in obtaining the loan, and further providing that the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract was subject to an existing lien and encumbrance 
of Clearfield State Bank due and owing thereon in the sum of 
$22,699.72. (Def.Exh.l) 
The escrow and closing statement of Security Title Company 
evidenced a payment deducted from the cash downpayment paid 
to sellers in the amount of $250.00 for the mortgage payment 
for August to Clearfield State Bank; the sum of $139.00 for 
title insurance; a sales commission of $2,274.00 to be paid to 
Appellant; closing costs in the amount of $34.00; all to be 
paid by Respondents. The Respondents receiving a net remittance 
from the downpayment in the sum of $1,681.00 with the sales 
commission being deferred. (Def.Exh.4) 
In the closing statement, there was no provision made 
for payments of any monies out of the agreed monthly installment 
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of $440.00 to be paid monthly by buyers for payment to the 
broker (Appellant) as and for sales commission on the sale 
of the property (Def.Exh.4). Security Title Company did, however, 
pay to the Appellant the sum of $286.00 as part of Appellant's 
sales commission. (R-121) 
The Respondents telephoned the Appellant approximately 
fifteen times and held conversations as to Respondents concern-
ing finalizing the sale and obtaining their equity. (R-118) 
The Appellant continually reassuring the Respondents, that 
money was difficult to obtain, but advising the Respondents 
in the latter part of September and early part of October, 
1974, that the loan could only be obtained by the buyers for 
approximately $31,000.00 (R-122) and the Respondents then realized 
for the first time, that "things were looking grim". (R-123) 
Upon the Appellant suggesting to the Respondents, that 
they should agree to a loss of points by accepting an F.H.A. 
loan by discounting the sale by $1,500.00 or more, the Respondents 
then were aware that there was no longer a sale and that the 
buyer was not a qualified and able buyer and could not qualify 
for a conventional loan. (R-119) 
The Respondent received monthly payments in the amount 
of $250.00 on October 31, 1974, and $250.00 on November 27, 
1974, which evidenced that from the $440.00 paid by the buyers 
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on monthly installments to Security Title Company, that $143.00 
was paid to Realex Realty, which is the company of the Appellant, 
each month, and that payments of $46.00 were paid towards the 
title insurance and $1.00 for escrow fee, leaving a net on 
each of the two checks in the amount of $250.00, which amount 
represented the payment on Clearfield State Bankfs secured 
lien so that the Respondents received no monies from the $440.00 
a month payments made for the months of October and November 
by the buyers. (Def.Exh.9) No other mortgage payments were 
made by the buyer nor received by the Respondents, other than 
the money set forth in Defendants1 Exhibit 9 above. (R-149) 
On October 18, 1974, the Respondent wrote a letter to 
Security Title advising Security Title not to pay other deduc-
tions from the amounts to be paid by the buyer and that, other 
than deduction of the $46.33 in accordance with the closing 
statement, agreed upon and which sets forth the handling of 
the funds to be made by Security Title, that the balance of 
the money in the amount of $393.67 must be turned over to the 
Respondents, who would then apply all of the funds to the balance 
due and owing to Clearfield State Bank. (Pl.Exh.l) 
On November 8, 1974, Attorney Pete N. Vlahos, as Attorney 
for the Respondents, advised the buyers that the sellers had 
been advised by Mr. Weaver, that the loan would be secured 
by the buyers on or about the 1st day of October, and based 
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upon that representation, the home was sold and making demand 
upon the buyers to make immediate application for a loan pursuant 
to the Uniform Real Estate Contract, and that unless the loan 
was completed no later then December 15, that legal action 
would be taken against the buyers and the Appellant for the 
numerous representations made and the failure of the buyers 
to perform in accordance with their agreement. (Def.Exh.5) 
On November 7, 1974, the Respondents sent a communication 
to the Appellant, advising that Respondents were induced to 
enter into an agreement to carry a part of the contract in 
the amount of $5,900.00, in that the buyers had qualified for 
a 9-3/4 percent loan and could only qualify for a $31,000.00 
to $32,000.00 (R-133,R-53), and the Respondent further stated: 
I feel you have not protected my interests as you 
said you would and also I will notify Mr. Stephens 
of this action for this has been dragging on since 
late July. As per my letter to Mr. Stephens of 
September 16, 1974, I stated that thirty days from 
that date the loan should be obtained, but have 
received nothing but static over it. (R-53) 
Mrs. Modula, one of the Respondents, corroborated the 
testimony of her spouse in affirming that in the conversation 
held with the Appellant prior to listing with the Appellant, 
that he was advised of the purpose of the sale of the home 
being for the Respondents to get all of their equity and that 
they would desire to be involved only with qualified buyers, 
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to which the Appellant agreed prior to the entering into of 
a brokerage agreement between the Respondents and the Appellant• 
(R-142,R-143) 
The buyers called the Respondents and advised that they 
could not continue making payments of $440.00 a month (R-176), 
and upon the failure of the buyers to obtain a loan, an Accord 
and Satisfaction was entered into by and between the Respondents 
and the buyers, wherein the buyers removed themselves from 
the premises and the property of the sellers, and upon the 
sellers, the Respondents herein, returning to the buyers the 
sum of $1,500.00. The agreement was subscribed to on December 17, 
1974, (Def.Exh.8) and subsequent thereto, the buyers moved 
to Arizona. (R-167) 
The present action before the Court was commenced when 
the Appellant brought an action against the Respondents seeking 
to collect his commissions upon the real estate sale that never 
matured and for which the Respondents refunded the buyers most 
of the monies paid in by the buyers. The Appellant seeking 
to recover the sum of $1,988.00, having already received the 
sum of $286.00, making an alleged brokerage and sales fee to 
the Appellant claimed due and owing in the amount of $2,274.00, 
and in addition to which the Appellant sought the highest legal 
rate of interest from August 27, 1974, plus attorney's fees 
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and costs of Court. (R-l and 2) 
The decision of the Lower Court as set forth in the 
Memorandum by the Court awarded a Judgment to the Respondents 
basing the Judgment upon the Sales Agency Contract entered 
into as between the Respondents and the Appellant and providing 
for the Appellant finding a buyer who was ready, able, and 
willing to purchase (emphasis by Court); the Court finding 
from the evidence before the Court and the record, that there 
was no money available for a straight mortgage; and that the 
buyer was not able to obtain financing (Court's emphasis); 
the Court setting forth that the Plaintiff entered into the 
final Earnest Money Agreement on the basis that the buyer would 
obtain immediate financing and that the Appellant was aware 
that the Defendants needed their equity out of the home and 
that obtaining that equity was part of the Appellant's and 
Respondents' agreement; that the Appellant was aware, or should 
have been aware, of the money situation and of the buyer's 
inability to obtain a straight financing; finding that the 
final contract entered into as between the Respondents and 
the buyer providing for a high monthly payment was only a temporary 
thing and was entered into based upon the buyer obtaining a 
loan to finance the purchase of the equity of the Respondents, 
and the further finding of the Court, that the Appellant breached 
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its fiduciary and agency relationship with the Respondents 
and in making full disclosure to the Respondents of information 
within the knowledge of the Appellant* (R-87,-88,-89) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT BREACHED HIS DUTY TO RESPONDENTS IN FAILING 
TO FIND A QUALIFIED BUYER ABLE TO PURCHASE PROPERTY. 
The Sales Agency Contract entered into by and between 
the Appellant with the Respondents provided specifically the 
finding of a party who is "ready, able, and willing to buy". 
(Def.Exh.3) In the case of Crampton v. Irwin, 203 P. 672, 
the Supreme Court of Colorado, Jan., 1922, the Court held that 
in a suit by a broker for a commission for procuring a purchaser, 
that it is not necessary to show the financial ability of the 
purchaser, but the right to recovery is controlled by the rule 
that when a sale of land does not take place, that the broker 
cannot recover a commission unless the broker alleges and proves 
that he produced a person ready, willing, and able to purchase 
the property on the terms and conditions on which he was authorized 
to negotiate a sale. 
The Appellant, after supposedly having qualified the 
Stephens as buyers, presented an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase on July 20, 1974, for a price of $39,900.00, 
-14-
setting forth that the buyers would obtain a conventional loan 
in the amount of 95 percent of the gross sales, less the earnest 
money of $500.00, and the contract was never performed by the 
buyers (Def.Exh.10); approximately twenty days later on August 10, 
1974, the Appellant brought an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase from the same buyers setting forth the same purchase 
price and providing for a payment of $2,000.00 down, providing 
for monthly installments of $365.00 and for the seller to carry 
the contract until the buyer would be able to obtain financing, 
to which the Respondents did not agree and made a counter-offer 
which was subscribed to and accepted by the buyer for the sale 
of the property at a lesser sum, namely the amount of $38,900.00 
and providing for the buyer to obtain financing "immediately" 
and providing for the seller to carry up to $2,000.00 on the 
contract at $75.00 a month, with the seller carrying $3,000.00, 
providing that the buyer paid all of the closing costs (Def.Exh.ll); 
subsequently seven days later on August 17, 1974, the Appellant 
offered an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase from 
the same buyer setting forth the price of $38,900.00 with a 
$2,000.00 downpayment and providing for the buyers to obtain 
a conventional loan as soon as possible, and providing for 
the sellers to carry a contract of $5,900.00 as part of the 
downpayment, with monthly payments of $440.00 to be made by 
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the buyers to the sellers until the loan had been arranged 
(Def.Exh.2)/ based upon the representations made by the Appellant, 
that the buyers would qualify for a $31,000.00 to $32,000.00 
loan and would be able to close the deal out within thirty 
days. (R-106) 
The Respondents relied upon the representations made 
by the buyers and the affirmation of the Appellant/ that the 
loan would be consummated as soon as an officer of the Clearfield 
State Bank returned from vacation (R-107,-108), and believing 
the representation did then enter into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract on August 27, 1974, which both the Respondents and 
the buyer believed only to be a temporary matter, in that the 
buyers could not afford to pay $440.00 a month for an indefinite 
period of time. (R-167) 
In Reynor v. Mackrill, 164 N.W. 335, the Supreme Court 
of Iowa (Oct., 1917), defined an able purchaser as follows: 
To be able means that the purchaser must have the 
money at the time to make any cash payments that 
are required in order to meet the terms of the seller 
and does not simply mean that the purchaser have 
property upon which he could raise the amount if 
necessary; but, as stated, he must actually have the 
money to meet the cash payment and be in shape 
financially to meet any deferred payments. 
1 A.L.R. 528-532 is an annotation on what constitutes 
ability to pay within rule as to brokerage right to commission 
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and clearly illustrates that in accordance with the facts heretofore 
set forth in this Brief, that the buyer was not an able and 
willing buyer and that the broker, the Appellant herein, should 
have reasonably known that the buyer would not qualify as an 
able buyer, and furthermore, the Statement of Facts set forth 
herein before show a continuous substitution of Earnest Money 
Agreements made by the Appellant, clearly evidencing the inability 
of the buyers to be able to enter into a loan and evidences 
that the Appellant was only seeking to maneuver himself into 
a position of collecting a commission rather than obtaining 
a real buyer able and willing to deal with the Respondents. 
In Pellatun v. Brunski, 231 P. 583, District Court of 
Appeals of California (Oct., 1924), the Court defined the word 
"able", meaning financially able, stated: 
This rule, however, does not mean that such purchaser 
must have all the money in his immediate possession 
or to his credit at a bank, but only that he must be 
able to command the necessary funds to close the deal 
within the time required. 
In Robertson v. Allen, 184 Fed. 372, 107 C C A . 254, 
the Court held that: 
A proposed purchaser cannot, therefore, be said to 
be able to purchase when he is dependent upon third 
parties, who are in no way bound to furnish the funds 
to make such purchase. 
The evidence in the instant matter before this Court 
shows that the Appellant informed the Respondents, that the 
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buyers had $2,500.00 put down as a downpayment for the purchase 
of the property (R-173), but that the Appellant had been told 
by the buyers that it would be necessary for them to borrow 
$2,000.00 from the parents of Mr. Stephens in order to obtain 
a $2,500.00 downpayment (R-173), which information was not 
given to the Respondents timely tR-174,R-175). 
In Johns v. Ambrose-Williams & Company, 317 P.2d 897, 
Supreme Court of Colorado (1957), the Court stated: 
This Court has repeatedly held that in these real 
estate commission cases, the broker, to sustain 
an action for commission, must do so by testimony 
that is clear and convincing, and we still adhere 
to that as a correct rule in such cases, and the 
reason for such rule cannot better be expressed 
than in one of the earliest decisions of our 
Court of Appeals, Babcock v. Merritt, 1 Colo.App. 
84, 27 P. 882, which is stated as follows: "The 
law should be so defined and construed as to 
afford the owner of property some protection against 
the persistent claims of brokers who seek the re-
covery on purely technical grounds, and at the 
same time, assure to the broker compensation for 
services honestly and actually rendered." 
In Hiniger v. Judy, 398 P.2d 305, Supreme Court of Kansas 
(Jan., 1965), the Court defined the Rule of Law as to when 
a broker is entitled to a commission by setting forth the following 
The general rule is that a real estate agent or 
broker is entitled to a commission if (a) he 
produces a buyer who is able, ready, and willing 
to purchase upon the profferred terms or upon 
terms acceptable to the principal; (b) he is 
the efficient and procuring cause of a consummated 
deal. 
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In Dobbs v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843, 30 A.L.R.3rd 
1370, (New Jersey Supreme Court, Dec. 18, 1967), the Supreme 
Court held that in order for a seller to be liable for the 
commission of a broker, that the following must be proven: 
(1) That a court must read into every real estate brokerage 
agreement or contract of sale a requirement that, barring default 
by the seller, a commission shall not be deemed earned against 
the seller unless the contract of sale is performed, and that 
when there is substantial inequality of bargaining power, position, 
or advantage in the broker's favor, any provision to the contrary 
in an agreement prepared, presented, negotiated, or procured 
by the broker shall be deemed unenforceable. 
(2) That as a matter of law, in the instant case, the 
owners were not liable to Plaintiff for the commission specified 
in the unconsummated contract of sale, since the buyer and 
owners had been brought together by Plaintiff and the failure 
to close title was due entirely to the buyer's financial incapacity 
to perform. 
(3) That when a prospective buyer solicits a broker 
to find or show him property which he might be interested in 
buying, and the broker finds property satisfactory to him which 
the owner agrees to sell at the price offered, and the buyer 
knows that the broker will earn a commission for the sale from 
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the owner, the law will imply a promise on the part of the 
buyer to complete the transaction with the owner, and the buyerfs 
failure or refusal to do so, without valid reason, renders 
him liable to the broker for breach of the implied promise***. 
In Winkelman v. Allen, 519 P.2d 1377, Supreme Court 
of Kansas (Mar., 1974), the Court defined what it considers 
as the meaning of a purchaser of real estate financially ready 
and able to buy when it stated the following necessary conditions: 
(1) If he has the needed cash in his hand, or 
(2) If he is personally possessed of assets - which 
in part may consist of a property to be purchased - and a credit 
rating which enables him with reasonable certainty to command 
the requisite funds at the required time, or 
(3) If he has definitely arranged to raise the necessary 
money - or as much thereof as he is unable to supply personally 
- by obtaining a binding committment for a loan to him for 
that purpose by a financially able third party. 
The Court further stated that in order for a real estate 
broker to be entitled to a commission for producing a purchaser 
"able, ready, and willing" to purchase the property, that: 
The broker has the obligation to inquire into the 
prospect's financial status and to establish his 
adequacy to fulfill the monetary conditions of the 
purchase. With this burden cast upon the real 
estate broker, the owner may accept the prospective 
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customer without being obligated to make an inde-
pendent inquiry into his financial capacity, and 
the owner is not estopped to assert lack of financial 
capacity on the part of the prospective customer 
simply because he "accepted" the buyer in the course 
of negotiations. 
The findings of the Lower Court in its Memorandum Decision 
by the specific finding that the buyer was not "able" to obtain 
financing; that the Plaintiff (Appellant) was aware that the 
Respondents needed their equity out of their home and the obtaining 
of that equity was part of the Appellant's and Respondents1 
agreement? and further, that the Appellant was aware, or should 
have been aware, of the money situation and of the buyer's 
inability to obtain straight financing. (R-87) 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAD DUAL CAPACITY OF AGENT WITH FIDUCIARY 
OBLIGATIONS TO RESPONDENTS. 
The Appellant testified that he was a real estate broker 
for Realex Realty (R-152) and that he entered into an agreement 
with the Respondents for the listing of the Respondents' home 
and for the sale of their home (R-153). 
On April 14, 1974, the Appellant entered into a Sales 
Agency Contract with the Respondents as broker and agent for 
the sale of the home and real property at 1287 Marilyn, Syracuse, 
Utah, for the sale of the home at a price of $38,900.00 and 
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providing for a conventional loan showing an existing mortgage 
on behalf of Clearfield State Bank of Clearfield, Utah, with 
a balance thereon in the amount of $22,800 .00. (Def.Exh.3) 
The Sales Agency Contract provided that the broker, the Appellant 
herein, was to find a party ready, able, and willing to buy 
and was advised by the Respondents, that the purpose of selling 
the home was to obtain the cash equity out of the home that 
belonged to the Respondents, in that they desired to build 
a new home and needed the equity in order to acquire land and 
build the new home, which they intended to acquire by the sale 
of the existing home. (R-101) 
The Appellant brought an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase to the Respondents on July 20, 1974, wherein the 
Stephens were the buyers and wherein a purchase price of $39,900.00 
was set forth with $500.00 down and the balance to be financed 
by a conventional loan of 95 percent, to which the buyers and 
the Respondents agreed and signed same. CDef.Exh.10) 
Approximately twenty days later on August 10, 1974, 
the Appellant brought another Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase to the Respondents providing for a downpayment 
of $2,000.00 against the purchase price of $39,900.00 and seller 
to carry the contract until the buyer is able to obtain financing, 
and specifically providing for conventional financing, to which 
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a counter-offer was made by the Respondents to sell the home 
for $38,900,00, and specifically provided that the seller would 
not carry the contract and that the buyer would obtain financing 
immediately and that the seller would carry up to $2,000.00 
on the contract at a specific monthly amount and interest rate 
on the contract. 
Appellant on August 17, 1974, brought another Earnest 
Money Agreement to the Respondents concerning the same buyers 
and provided therein, that for a total purchase price of $38,900.00 
with a $2,000.00 downpayment and for the Respondents to carry 
a contract balance in the amount of $5,900.00 (Def. Exh.2). 
Appellant at that time advised the Respondents, that he had 
a lender who would loan $31,000.00 to $32,000.00 and that the 
deal would be closed within thirty days (R-118,-119). 
The Appellant further advised the Respondent, that the 
buyers wanted to move into the home before the start of the 
school year, which was August 26, and he believed that the 
loan was secure and that there would be no problems, and upon 
that representation, the Respondents moved out of their home 
(R-107). Following the signing of the Earnest Money Agreement 
on August 17, the Respondents relying upon the qualification 
of the Stephens as an able and willing buyer entered into a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, in that they had no other choice 
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in that they had moved out of their home and had turned possession 
of the home over to the alleged buyers and having expended 
monies in their new premises, which although temporary were 
intended to be used until they would buy and build their new 
home. (R-123) 
The Appellant knew that the buyers had only been a few 
months in the area (R-166); that although the buyers told the 
Appellant that they were looking for a home in a range of approxi-
mately $300.00 a month (R-167)/ that the temporary agreement 
of $440.00 a month was entered as the amount to be paid monthly 
by the buyers; that the buyers, in fact, did not have $2,500.00 
to pay as a downpayment but had only $500.00 and would have 
had to borrow the $2,000.00 from their parents in order to 
be able to make a downpayment in excess of the $500.00 (R-
173); that the Appellant had contacted a large number of institutioi 
all of whom had rejected the loan (R-161); that in fact the 
buyer did move out of the State not long after the Respondents 
had returned to the buyers the $1,500.00 of their downpayment 
(R-167); that Zions Bank had advised the Appellant, that they 
were making no loans whatsoever on any real estate deal even 
with 25 percent down (R-1841; all of which information was 
not revealed by the Appellant to the Respondents nor were they 
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advised thereof. That the Appellant did not consider himself 
as the exclusive agent of the Respondents, nor did the Appellant 
consider himself as being the fiduciary of the Respondents 
when in answer to questions and use of "we"/ the Appellant 
stated: 
I would say that as things progress, while we 
did look at it, we all agree, and I might clarify 
it that when I say "we", it is myself, it's 
Mr. Modula, it's Mr. Stephens. Really, I was 
the agent for Mr. Modula in trying to work his 
interest and trying to work Mr. Stephens interest, 
so that they were both happy, and eventually, 
this is what it turned out to. (R-155) ***And 
then, as we progressed down along the same line, 
the same comments were brought up at Security 
Title and they (the Respondents) wanted Mr. Gurr 
to put this exact date in there; and, of course, 
Mr. Stephens, he just couldn't accept this type 
of a situation. I couldn't recommend that he 
get into that situation. (R-156) 
In further regard to the Appellant's attitude of his 
relationship as between the Respondents as the sellers, himself 
as a real estate broker, and the buyers, the following Interro-
gatory was asked by the attorney for the Respondents and replied 
to by the Appellant as follows: 
Q. You knew if you were acting in your fiduciary capacity, 
that your responsibility was to the sellers; wasn't it? You 
had no obligation to the buyers? Your's was to the sellers; 
they were paying you the commission; they were the ones that 
had given you specific instructions; isn't that a fair statement, 
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Mr. Weaver? 
A. Well, not completely. It's true that I have a fiduciary 
relationship, and I work for the sellers, and working for the 
sellers I also have to work for the buyers. And so I have 
to really serve both people. (R-169,R-170) 
In Reese v. Harper, 8 Ut.2d 119, 329 P.2d 410, the Supreme 
Court of Utah (Sept., 1958), the question arose as to the nature 
and extent of the duty which a real estate agent owes to his 
principal and whether or not the Plaintiff discharged it. 
Mr. Harper was the seller and engaged the services of Mr. Reese 
for the sale of a farm, and asked that a buyer be found to 
purchase the property of Mr. Harper, wherein a $45,000.00 price 
was set by the seller as the value he wished to receive. Five 
days after the agency agreement, the agent proposed to the 
seller a deal with a buyer for the property to be sold for 
$30,000.00 and evidencing that there should be no encumbrances 
upon the sale of the property. The seller signed an Earnest 
Money Agreement to that affect and believed that the obligations 
which the seller had as encumbrances against the property in 
the amount of $15,000.00 would be paid by the buyer, and that 
the $30,000.00 represented the net amount to be paid to the 
seller. This would have given the seller approximately $45,000.00 
that they were asking. When the seller made a final determin-
ation, that the $30,000.00 offer was not exclusive of the payment 
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of the encumbrances owed, but that same would be deducted from 
the amount, refused to sign the agreement and thereafter the 
broker filed suit against the seller for a commission on the 
sale of the property which had not been consummated. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that: 
The above contention is sound as between people 
dealing with each other under usual circumstances* 
But the relationship of real estate agent and client 
makes the situation quite different. The agent is 
issued a license and permitted to hold himself out 
to the public as qualified by training and experienced 
to render a specialized service in a field of real 
estate transactions. There rests upon him the 
responsibility of honestly and fairly representing 
the interest of those who engage his services, and 
upon failing to do so his license may be revoked. 
Accordingly, persons who entrust their business to 
such agents are entitled to repose some degree of 
confidence that they will be loyal to such trust, 
and that they will, with reasonable diligence and 
in good faith, represent the interests of their 
client. Unless the law demands this standard, 
instead of being the badge of competence and inte-
grity it is supposed to be, the license would serve 
only as a foil to lure the unsuspecting public in 
to be duped by people more skilled and experienced 
in such affairs than are they, when they would be 
better off taken care of such business for themselves. 
The Court then stated the Rule: 
Because of the specialized service the real estate 
broker offers in acting as an agent for his client, 
there arises a fiduciary relationship between them; 
it is incumbent upon him to apply his abilities 
and knowledge to the advantage of the man he 
serves; and to make full disclosure of all facts 
which his principal should know in transacting 
the business. Failure to discharge such duty 
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with reasonable diligence and care precludes his 
recovery for the service he purports to be 
rendering. 
The Court further observed that the broker was not dischargee 
in duty, in that he had not explained the contract to his client 
nor called to the client's attention the variance in the terms, 
and upon suit of the broker for his commission/ the Court held: 
Under these circumstances/ it was the duty of 
the agent to disclose to his principal the vast 
differences in the terms***. This duty was not 
discharged by simply handing to the owner an 
unsigned contract***. It was his duty to inform 
his principal of all facts which might influence 
his principal in accepting or rejecting the 
offer. An agent is not entitled to recover until 
he has fully performed this duty***. 
In the instant matter before the Court, the Appellant 
herein appeared to be acting on the presumption that he was 
a fiduciary and an agent of both the seller and the buyer, 
and the Appellant did not reveal information which was made 
known to the Appellant which would have prevented the Respondents 
from suffering the time and loss of money which they suffered/ 
and specifically/ the Appellant had not continuously informed 
the Respondents of the inability of the buyer to be able to 
complete the transactions of the purchase of the property of 
the Respondents/ and that the buyer, even if it can be conceded 
that he was willing, was not an "able" buyer. 
In Morley v. J. Pagel Realty and Insurance, 550 P.2d 
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1104, the Court of Appeals of Arizona (June, 1976). The Court 
defined a duty of a real estate broker by reaffirming a previous 
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in stating: 
The real estate agent owes a duty of utmost good 
faith and loyalty to the principal, and one 
employed to sell property has the specific duty 
of exercising reasonable due care and diligence 
to effect a sale to the best advantage of the 
principal - that is, on the best terms and at the 
best price possible. ***He is also under a duty 
to disclose to his client information he possesses 
pertaining to the transaction in question. 
At the time of the entering into the last Earnest Money 
Agreement and the subsequent Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
the Appellant was well aware that the arrangement by the buyer 
to pay $440.00 a month was an arrangement that the buyer did 
not desire to continue, but was only a temporary arrangement 
until a loan was arranged, and further, the Appellant knew 
that it was not the intent, at any time, of the Respondents 
to carry the entire contract balance and continued to receive 
the monthly installments without the Respondents being paid 
for at least the remainder of their cash equity between the 
amount that the Respondents agreed to carry and the difference 
between the mortgage lien of Clearfield State Bank and the 
amount remaining would have been available to the Respondents 
for the purpose of buying a lot and constructing their new 
home, and that under no circumstances was the entering into 
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of a Uniform Real Estate Contract final in accordance with 
the desires and intent of either the Respondents or the buyers, 
and that the subsequent necessity of the Respondents paying 
back to the buyers $1,500.00 of their downpayment in order 
to facilitate the buyers in removing themselves from the property 
of the sellers, could not under any circumstances have been 
a final sale so as to further encumber the Respondents with 
a total 6-percent brokerage fee due and owing by the Respondents 
to the Appellant for a sale of the property. 
In Westco Realty, Inc., v. Drewry, 515 P.2d 513, Court 
of Appeals of Washington, Sept., 1973, the Court stated: 
It is true, that as a general rule, a real estate 
broker becomes entitled to his commission as soon 
as he procures a purchaser who is accepted by the 
principal and with whom the principal enters into 
a binding and enforceable contract. ** It is also 
true, though, that this rule is not applicable 
where the principal's acceptance of the purchaser 
occurs under circumstances amounting to a breach 
of a broker's duty of loyalty to his principal. 
In 12 Am.Jur.2d, Brokers, Sec. 168 (1964), at page 909, 
the rule is succinctly stated as follows: 
A broker is not entitled to compensation if he 
fails to disclose to his principal any personal 
knowledge which he possesses relative to matters 
which are or may be material to his employer's 
interest, or if he acts adversely thereto, either 
for the purpose of aiding another or with a design 
of securing a secret profit for himself, or other-
wise advancing his own welfare at the expense of 
that of his employer. (Emphasis Added) 
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In Hiniger v. Judy, supra, the Supreme Court of Kansas 
held that: 
That the primary relation as between customer and 
real estate broker, is that of agency, the general 
rules of law applicable to principal and agent 
govern their rights and liabilities. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas further stated: 
Whether a broker has performed services entitling 
him to a commission is ordinarily a question of 
fact for the jury, if there is conflict in 
evidence or if there is any substantial evidence 
to support the essential elements of his cause of 
action. 
The matter presently before this Court was heard by 
the Judge as a Trier of Facts and the Memorandum Decision of 
the Court after hearing all of the testimony and weighing the 
credibility of all witnesses found as follows: 
The final contract, as entered into, called for ex-
ceptionally high payments that the Plaintiff alleged 
was put in there so that the buyer would obtain 
a loan. The Court finds that it was never the 
intention of the buyer and the seller to enter 
into the final contract as a final contract, 
but that it was a temporary thing based upon 
the buyer obtaining a loan and supplying the 
seller with his equity. **The total transaction 
from the beginning to the end was based upon the 
buyer obtaining a loan whereby the seller would 
obtain his equity from his property. 
The Court finds that there was a fiduciary rela-
tionship between Plaintiff and Defendants which 
required Plaintiff to make full disclosure of 
all facts which his principal should know in 
transacting the business between them; and if 
the Defendants had been informed that there was 
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a good chance that the buyer would be unable to 
obtain financing because of the money situation, 
the final offer would have been rejected and the 
final contract would not have been entered into. 
(R-87,R-88) 
The Trier of Fact further found that: 
It appears that the Plaintiff was primarily 
interested in obtaining his commission and 
allowing Defendants to enter into the final 
contract under the belief, that the buyer was 
an able buyer and would obtain financing, and 
that the Plaintiff knew or should have known 
that there was no money available in order for 
the purchaser to complete the contract. (R-88) 
In Rattray v. Scudder, 169 P.2d 371, the Supreme Court 
of California (1946) , held that the duty imposed upon a real 
estate agent is the same obligation of undivided service and 
loyalty that it imposes upon a trustee in favor of his benefi-
ciary. The California Supreme Court further stated that an 
agent is charged with a duty of fullest disclosure of all material 
facts concerning the transaction that might affect the principal's 
decision. 
In Reich v. Christopulos, 256 P.2d 238, the Supreme 
Court of Utah stated the rule of the duty of the agent and 
broker by adopting the definition set forth in 4 Am.Jur., Brokers, 
Section 142, page 1067, by quoting: 
The faithful discharge of his duties is a condition 
precedent to any recovery upon the part of the 
broker for the services he has rendered to his 
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principal, thus, he is not entitled to compensa-
tion if he fails to disclose to his principals 
any personal knowledge which he possesses relative 
to matters which are or may be material to his 
employerf s interest* * *. 
The Appellant in its Point II makes a general allegation, 
that all of the testimony which was admitted in the Lower Court 
without objection by either of the parties hereto, which defined 
in general the state of mind and intent of the parties in entering 
into the contract, is in some ways non-admissible evidence, 
even though there had been no objection to same, and makes 
objection now for the first time in the Brief of the Appellant 
before this Court (Appellant's Brief, p. 10). 
It is submitted to this Court, that in the case of Roungren 
v. Lloyd Construction Company, 22 Ut.2d 207, 450 P.2d 985 (1969), 
this Court stated: 
**The Parol Evidence Rule, "while simple to state, 
is often confusing in its application, due largely 
to misunderstanding of its purposes; that is 
attempting to apply a rule rather than a reason". 
Consistent with that idea, that the Rule should 
not be regarded as applicable in rigidity and 
without exception, but in the light of reason 
under the particular circumstances, is this thought 
pertinent here: The fact that the parties have 
a written contract on a subject does not prevent 
them from entering into other agreements relating 
to the same general subject matter. 
The Appellant in an attempt to support his theory of 
exclusion of Parol Evidence quoted from Ruff v. Boltz, 448 
P.2d 549, 252 Or.2d 236 (1968) (Appellant's Brief, p. 16), 
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however an examination of the case evidences that the Oregon 
Court recognized an exception where there is an allegation 
of fraud, and it is pointed out to the Court, that the Counterclaim 
of the Respondents before the Court sets forth an allegation 
of fraud and deceit (R-3 - 6), that the Oregon Court held, 
that by the terms of the Parol Evidence Rule a showing of fraud 
is an exception to the prohibition on the use of Parol Evidence 
to vary a written contract. 
The Appellant further cited in support of his position, 
that he had not breached a fiduciary duty by failing to disclose 
that there was no loan money available to purchaser, the case 
of Martineau v. Hansen, 47 Ut. 549, 155 P. 432 (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 17). The attention of the Court is called to the 
specific exception to a broker being entitled to the commission 
when the Court adopted the following citation from the Law 
of Agency, and stated: 
Yet, if the principal in accepting him (the 
prospective purchaser) as a purchaser did not 
rely on his own judgment, but rather upon that 
of the broker, and the purchaser is not able 
to comply with his contract, the broker would 
not be entitled to commission; nor would he be 
entitled to commissions if the ratification was 
made on the strength of false statements made 
by him. 
It is submitted to the Court, that the Respondents herein 
made no independent investigation whatsoever of the buyer, 
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but relied solely upon the skill of the broker in qualifying 
the prospective buyers, and in particular, the buyer involved 
in this transaction, and that, therefore, the exception set 
forth by this Court in the Martineau case, supra, is dispositive 
of this issue. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL DAMAGES 
PROXIMATELY FLOWING FROM WRONGFUL ACTS OF APPELLANT. 
The facts and the record before this Court are adequately 
covered by the Memorandum Decision of the Lower Court, wherein 
the Court found: 
The obtaining of a title policy for purchaser who 
is not an able buyer is an expense attributable 
to the breach on Plaintiff's part. Defendants 
are granted Judgment on their Counterclaim for 
$286.00 for the commission paid, $190.00 for the 
title policy and costs. Defendants are further 
granted $500.00 attorney's fees for the defense 
of this action. The granting of the attorney's 
fees is based upon Plaintiff's insistence upon 
attorney's fees under the agreement which fairness 
in equity and due process would require said 
provision to work both ways. (R-89) 
It is submitted to this Court, that the action in the 
Lower Court was brought by the Appellant in an attempt to recover 
the total 6 percent on the selling price of the property in 
the amount of $38,900.00, and that the Appellant sought in 
its Complaint to recover the attorneyls fees and costs of Court. 
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The Lower Court, sitting as a Court of equity as well 
as law, gave equity to the Respondents by awarding to the Respondeni 
the sum determined by the Court to be reasonable and which 
was testified to by the Respondents as the amount agreed to be 
paid to their attorney, namely the sum of $500.00, and it is 
submitted to the Court, that the Judgment of the Court was 
a fair and equitable award* 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents submit to this Honorable Court, that the 
conclusions of the Lower Court are valid and uncontradictable, 
that the Appellant undertook to find a buyer qualified and 
able to purchase the home of the Respondents, and that the 
buyer was not a qualified and able buyer, and that the obli-
gation of the Appellant was that of one standing in a fiduciary 
relationship to the Respondents, as well as the Appellant being 
an agent of the Respondents, and that as such, the Appellant 
did not make complete revelation of all pertinent and substan-
tive facts known to the Appellant concerning the ability of 
the buyer to be an able purchaser, and that the Appellant's 
inducement of the Respondents to enter into a contract of sale, 
which was never performed by the buyer and the consequent refund 
of the buyer's downpayment and cancellation of the sale by 
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the Respondents, was a proximate result of the breach of the 
obligations of the Appellant in his fiduciary and agency capacity 
to the Respondents; that the Respondents are further entitled 
to recover the closing costs and brokerage fees paid by Respondents 
and further, that the Appellant having sought by reason of 
a contract in writing providing for attorney's fees to collect 
same by initiating an action against the Respondents, that 
the Respondents having been found by the Lower Court to be 
the injured party should in equity receive the reasonable attorney's 
fees resulting to the Respondents by reason of the action brought 
by the Appellant in the Lower Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETE N. VLAHOS " 
Attorney for Respondents 
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